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The oft-quoted American sports slogan,“Winning isn’t everything. It’s the only thing!”could well be attributed to the economic
importance of firm formation in creating jobs. A
relatively new dataset from the U.S. government
called Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) confirms
that startups aren’t everything when it comes to job
growth. They’re the only thing. 
By now it is well understood that firms large and
small are continuously and simultaneously destroying
and creating jobs. Even a mild level of this creative-
destructive churn points to a dynamic economy
much different than static economic models can
describe. However, beyond the job churn at existing
firms, there is a dynamic in firm birth that seems to
be very important for understanding job creation—
specifically, the unique effect of new firms, or
startups. Put simply, this paper shows that without
startups, there would be no net job growth in the
U.S. economy. This fact is true on average, but also
is true for all but seven years for which the United
States has data going back to 1977.
The BDS is the first publicly available dataset that
incorporates the age of firms in a dynamic format
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2008). Figure 1
presents summary data from the BDS,1 showing that
firms in their first year of existence add an average
of 3 million jobs per year. By construction, the 
BDS defines an existing firm—age one up to age
twenty-six and beyond—such that it can both create
and lose jobs. In contrast, a startup, or age zero
firm, only creates jobs because it experiences no
gross job destruction. We might anticipate that the
net job gain also would be positive at existing firms,
but that is decisively not the case during most years
on record. Notably, the figure shows that, during
recessionary years, job creation at startups remains
stable, while net job losses at existing firms are
highly sensitive to the business cycle. 
An important caveat is that existing firms are so
diverse that it can be misleading to think of a
“typical” firm. For example, there are two simple
categories of existing firms: those that go out of
business (Deaths) and those that continue
1. See http://webserver03.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_database_list. 
Figure 1: 
Startups Create Most New Net Jobs in 
the United States
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(Survivors). On balance, existing firms lose more jobs
than they create. But once Deaths are set aside,
Survivors usually create more net jobs than startups
do. Among Survivors, so-called gazelle firms are
certainly more important still. 
For a technical note on the construction of the
data in this paper, see Appendix 1. One needs to be
careful when glancing at the economy-wide BDS
tables, because categories are described in terms of
establishments rather than firms. Since a firm can
have multiple establishments, there can be
confusion between continuing firms (which may
experience establishment births and deaths) and
continuing establishments. This paper focuses on
firms, since that is how startups are defined, and so
reconfigures BDS aggregates using sub-aggregate
numbers. To avoid confusion I introduce the term
Survivors to describe continuing firms
In sum, the new firm-level summary data in Figure
1 reveal that startup firms are responsible for all net
job creation during most years, while existing firms
(aged one year and older) are usually net job losers.
To be fair, startups have a definitional advantage
because they can’t lose jobs, and some of their
created jobs will surely be lost by next year’s age one
firms. Only a closer annual look will clarify that
matter. Also, these are counts of jobs within the firm
itself, not its impact on other firms (which could cut
either way). What Figure 1 doesn’t reveal then is the
gross flows within the firm age categories, which is
the inspiration for this study. We would like to know
whether age one firms are net job creators. Ideally,
we would like to pinpoint the transition year when
firms become net job destroyers, or find if a
consistent pattern even exists.
The seminal study of the BDS data by Haltiwanger,
Jarmin, and Miranda (2008) describes the data in
great detail and provides this context: “The annual
job creation rate is about 18 percent (as a percent of
employment), suggesting that, on average in any
given year, about 18 percent of jobs are newly
created. About one-third of the annual job-creation
rate is due to establishment entry. The very high rate
of gross job creation is balanced with a very high
rate of gross job destruction. The gross job
destruction rate is around 16 percent on average,
indicating that about 16 percent of jobs that existed
one year prior no longer exist. About one-third of
the job destruction is accounted for by
establishment exit.” 
The vital role of startups, distinct from new firms
ages one to five, can be revealed by taking a close
look at the time series of job creation and
destruction. The next section provides a cursory
theoretical view of such a time series, followed by a
section on the empirical patterns found in the BDS.
Theory
Describing aggregate job creation and job
destruction curves over the age of firms is essentially
summing up the life cycle of all firms in the
economy, but doing so at a point in time. Most
business executives might imagine the aggregate
pattern of job creation as a large-scale version of a
highly simplified life cycle of a typical firm: a bell-
shaped curve with rapid net employment growth
during the first phase, followed by stability and then
a slow decline. 
Jovanovic (1982) presented one of the first models
of a firm’s life cycle, which shows a more complex
growth path. We know that firms start and end with
zero employees, but there is no “typical” pattern to
hiring given the various factors that influence each
Figure 2: 
Employment Over Time at Three 
Theoretical Firms
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individual firm. The sketch provided here in Figure 2
is highly simplified for purposes of discussion, using
a life cycle pattern that is mathematically described
by a concave function. Firm 1 peaks at nineteen
employees and closes after twenty-five years. Firm 2
peaks higher at the nine-year point with more than
thirty employees, but is shuttered six years later. 
Firm 3 has five employees, but closes within three
years of its founding. If we summed up net job
creation across all firms, we would get a concave
curve, as well, but it would skew left toward 
the origin.
Next, we can imagine separate curves for
aggregate job creation (JC) and aggregate job
destruction (JD). Figure 3 shows what the theoretical
national job creation and job destruction curves
might look like over a given period. Logically, JD is
greater than JC at the end of the aggregate life
cycle, and vice versa. There must be a transition
time, T*, when the number of jobs created at the
aggregate, or “average,” firm equals the number
destroyed. Before T*, the firm was a net creator of
jobs, but after T* it becomes a net destroyer. Surely,
a firm will hire even while in decline, just as it lays
off employees during the growth phase, so both
curves will have non-zero values during the life cycle
of the typical firm.
With the BDS, we should be able to reveal the
shape of such aggregate curves based on empirical
data, as well as how the curves shift during periods
of economic recession and recovery.
Empirics
The most “novel aspects” of the BDS, per
Haltiwanger, et al., are its treatments of business
dynamics by firm age. In any given year, BDS has
disaggregated job flows for all firms that originate
that year (i.e., year 0), as well as prior years one, two,
three, four, five, and then five-year aggregates of
years six to ten, eleven to fifteen, etc., through
twenty-six plus. The first year of data availability is
1977, so all firms established in prior years are left
uncategorized. 
By averaging the time series of gross flows across
all firms of the same age, researchers can map out an
empirically-based aggregate JC–JD curve like the
theoretical Figure 3. Haltiwanger, et al., did this in
terms of JC and JD rates (see their charts 8–13).
However, their comparative JC–JD rates do not allow
analysis of startup firms, because each one has a
combined churn rate of 200 percent, by construction.
The authors do provide a chart showing net job
creation (their chart 15) that includes a dimension for
firm size as well, then show separate gross measures
(their charts 16 and 17).
In Figure 4, I present gross aggregate job flows by
firm age from the BDS years 1992–2005, which show
JC and JD together with just the age dimension.
Cropping the data at the years 1992–2005 allows for
complete age groups up to the eleven- to fifteen-year
bracket. To make the age brackets comparable, I
divided bracket sums by the number of years in each
bracket. Doing so reveals that gross job creation at
startups in the United States averaged more than 
3 million jobs per year during 1992–2005, four times
higher than any other yearly age group. For
comparison, there are an average of 800,000 jobs
created at firms in their first full year and 500,000 at
firms in their third full year. In a given year, firms in
the age group six to ten total 335,000 gross jobs
created, for a typical year. That means that all firms in
a latter age group create one-tenth the jobs created
by startups. For example, in 2005, startups created
3.5 million jobs, compared to the 355,000 gross jobs
created that year by firms founded in 1995. However,
the 1995 firms also lost a gross 422,000 jobs. Indeed,
existing firms in all year groups have gross job losses
that are larger than gross job gains.
Figure 3: 
Hypothetical Aggregate Job Creation 
and Job Destruction, by Firm Age
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This paints a picture surprisingly different from
what informed, conventional wisdom presumably
imagines. In other words, Figure 3 is wrong. The
reality is that the JC and JD curves are (or appear to
be, based on BDS data) convex rather than concave.
Moreover, the transition point T* is distinctly at or
below year one. This means that early assessments
of the BDS claiming that all net job growth comes
from firms less than five years old is correct, but
now appear pessimistic. The five-year claim is based
on aggregating firm ages zero to five. A closer
analysis presented here indicates net job growth in
the United States comes from firms less than one
year old, formally defined as startups. Since the BDS
uses annualized data, we can measure T* only as
precisely as the first year, but it stands to reason that
it lies at the three- to nine-month point after firm
founding.
It must be said that Figure 4 is not inclusive of all
possible firms since it leaves out those aged sixteen
and above. The BDS shows that older firms (those
founded prior to 1977) have large relative JC and JD
flows. However, this older category includes firms
that are twenty-five, fifty, and even 100 years old, so
we can only guess that their specific year groups
would have continually declining measured flows 
if included in Figure 4, which clearly shows a
monotonic decline of gross flows with firm age.
What we can say from the BDS aggregate of these
older firms is that their total JD flow exceeds JC,
similar to the pattern identified here.
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Analysis
This paper presents a newly constructed national
time series of job creation by startup firms, using
annual data from the BDS for age zero firms.
Startups create an average of 3 million new jobs
annually. All other ages of firms, including
companies in their first full years of existence up to
firms established two centuries ago, are net job
destroyers, losing 1 million jobs net combined per
year. Patterns of job growth at startups and existing
firms are both pro-cyclical, although existing firms
have much more cyclical variance.
The implication of this finding could, and perhaps
should, shift the standard employment policy
paradigm. Policymakers tend to reflect common
media stereotypes about job changes in the
economy, which is to say a focus on the very large
aggregate picture (such as the national or state
unemployment rate) or on news of very large layoffs
by individual companies. That attention is almost
certainly misplaced. Nationwide measures are a
blunt tool for analysis, and net employment growth
reveals little that policy can affect. 
Similarly, the common zero-sum attempts to
incentivize firm relocation are oblivious to the
important pattern of gross job creation revealed by
the BDS. States and cities with job creation policies
aimed at luring larger, older employers can’t help
but fail, not just because they are zero-sum, but
because they are not based in realistic models of
employment growth. Job growth is driven,
essentially entirely, by startup firms that develop
organically. To be sure, Survivors create zero to 
7 million net jobs (half of which are at establishment
births), while Deaths account for a net loss of 
4 million to 8 million jobs, which are large flows 
for the context of the steady job creation of 
3 million startup jobs. But, in terms of the life 
cycle of job growth, policymakers should appreciate
the astoundingly large effect of job creation in the
first year of a firm’s life. In other words, the BDS
indicates that effective policy to promote
employment growth must include a central
consideration for startup firms.
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Appendix 1. Constructing
JC-JD Data by Firm Age
Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) are made
publicly available in a variety of ways through the
government Web site http://www.ces.census.gov/
index.php/bds. The data are described this way: 
BDS are created from the Longitudinal
Business Database (LBD), a confidential
database available to researchers
throughout the network of Census
Research Data Centers. BDS development
at CES was partially funded by the
Kauffman Foundation. A unique feature of
the BDS is its longitudinal source data that
permit tracking establishments and firms
over time. The public-use BDS tabulations
are an effort to make information from the
confidential LBD accessible to a broad
range of data users. Other efforts under
way include creating a fully synthetic
microdata file based on the LBD. The 
BDS series provides annual statistics for
1976–2005.
The “economywide” spreadsheet, which can be
found at http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/
bds_database_list, has a column for annual
“Job_Creation” (which I will abbreviate JC) and its
subcomponents in columns “JC_Births” and
“JC_Continuers.” The BDS definition of JC_Births is
not the same as JC at startups, however, since births
include new establishments at existing firms (e.g., the
Sears store at a newly constructed shopping mall). 
I constructed a new series called JC_Startups by
culling the gross job creation from the annual BDS
spreadsheet table titled “Firm Age.” An example of
1997 Firm Age data is presented in Table 1.
The cell for JC_Births of Firm Age 0 in 1997 is
3,059,236. I culled this cell from each annual table
for the entire series to make a column comparable
to the economy-wide data. Note, Table 1 shows
JC_Births for firms age one, age two, and all the
way up to age bracket sixteen to twenty, as well as
uncategorized (i.e., “left uncensored”) firms that
were founded prior to the BDS series (1977).
Next, I created a second new series for net job
change of continuing firms. This includes
JC_Continuers (which is limited to existing
establishments at existing firms) as well as JC from
a) 0 526,670 3,072,093 3,059,236 3,059,236 0 0 0 0
b) 1 401,523 2,926,411 912,142 115,507 796,635 861,247 506,110 355,137
c) 2 342,514 2,664,950 620,174 84,505 535,669 789,865 438,741 351,124
d) 3 291,957 2,489,348 521,568 82,156 439,412 628,216 312,872 315,344
e) 4 250,710 2,218,589 426,307 71,334 354,973 535,341 243,660 291,681
f) 5 225,278 2,242,027 422,028 69,240 352,788 459,255 201,106 258,149
g) 6–10 969,745 11,077,695 1,842,539 383,615 1,458,924 2,027,856 772,626 1,255,230
h) 11–15 745,874 9,879,301 1,552,703 367,340 1,185,363 1,582,429 578,638 1,003,791
i) 16–20 617,835 10,110,977 1,564,806 455,928 1,108,878 1,478,215 444,970 1,033,245
l) Left 
Censored 1,679,212 56,743,897 7,631,252 2,169,939 5,461,313 7,377,465 2,436,215 4,941,250
m) ALL 6,051,318 103,425,288 18,552,755 6,858,800 11,693,955 15,739,889 5,934,938 9,804,951
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics.
EstabsFirm Age
Job_ 
CreationEmployment
JC_
Continuers
JC _
Births
Job_
Destruction
Deaths
Job_
Destruction
Continuers
Job_
Destruction
Table 1: Annual BDS Data for 1997 by Firm Age
1977 3,678,254 505,053
1978 2,389,561 1,584,463
1979 2,839,666 1,143,865
1980 2,493,488 -1,615,875
1981 3,126,098 -2,271,818
1982 2,759,993 -2,554,516
1983 2,235,799 -4,227,716
1984 2,558,051 1,994,505
1985 2,878,640 -132,860
1986 3,036,472 -663,117
1987 3,261,050 -2,060,647
1988 2,988,404 169,818
1989 2,878,562 -572,196
1990 2,919,266 -458,161
1991 2,666,705 -4,008,737
1992 2,802,951 -2,341,570
1993 2,623,685 -888,863
1994 2,902,461 -1,142,396
1995 2,935,062 710,181
1996 2,953,276 -1,193,941
1997 3,059,236 -246,371
1998 3,455,186 -130,450
1999 3,220,463 -744,582
2000 3,086,508 524,335
2001 2,890,248 -2,397,512
2002 3,223,919 -5,021,578
2003 3,125,422 -1,067,903
2004 3,116,725 -1,226,832
2005 3,569,440 -1,088,343
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Table 2: 
U.S. Job Growth at Startups 
versus Existing Firms, 1977–2005
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, reconfigured by
Tim Kane, The Kauffman Foundation.
births not at startups (i.e., new establishments at
existing firms) less JD_Deaths. Job creation at births,
not at startups, averages around 2 million jobs
annually. My two series, Net Job Change at Startups
(identical to JC at startup, since JD is zero) and 
Net Job Change at Existing Firms, are presented in 
Table 2, as well as in Figure 1. To confirm the
accuracy of my counts, I checked the sum of these
two series against net job creation overall, and 
they aligned perfectly.
Year
Net Job
Change –
Startups
Net Job 
Change –
Existing Firms
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